下面是小编为大家整理的国际政,治研究所：5G地缘政,治【精选推荐】,供大家参考。
5
G
technol ogies
are reshaping
the w a y
user s
e xperience
the digital
sphere
and,
thus, their
dail y
lives.
5G
is one
o f
the game
changer s
tha t
w oul d
further
enable
c yber space ’ s po ten tialities
f or
our
socie ties,
ec onomies,
and
lifes t yle.
Ye t,
there
are
mul tiple
and c on tr as ting
geopolitical
in terests
and
securit y
c oncerns
regar ding
5G
adoptions
and implemen ta tions.
The
curren t
c onfr on ta tion
be t ween
Chinese
c ompanies
and
some
Wes tern go vernmen ts
is
emblema tic.
Wha t
are
the
political
and
securitarian
implications
o f
such
technol ogical
dispu tes?
Ho w
are s ta tes
dealing
with
the securit y
o f
5G
technol ogies?
* Samuel e
Dominioni is
a
R esear ch
F ell o w
at
the ISPI
Cen tr e
on Cybersecurity ,
in
partnership
with
Leonar do.
* Cou nsel or
F abio
R ugge
is
H ead
o f
ISPI"s
Cen tr e
on Cybersecurity ,
in
partnership
with
Leonar do.
H e
is
a dipl omat
curr en tl y
working as
H ead
o f
the
Offic e
in
char ge
f or
NA T O
and
Security
and
Politico-Milit ary Issues, Dir ect or at e
Gener al f or
Politic al A ff airs
and
Security ,
Ministry
o f
F or eign A ff airs
and
In t ernational Cooper ation.
1.
5G
IN
A
C ONTE S TED
DOMAIN
FABIO
R UGGE
(MAECI
and
ISPI)
2.
WHA T
DOE S THE
EU
S A Y
ABOUT
5G? C orr ado
Gius t o zzi
(ENIS A
and
AGID )
3.
THE
“UK
TURN”
ON
5G,
A
DOMINO
EFFE C T? E s ther
Na ylor
(Cha tham
House )
4.
THE
R A CE
OF
CHINE SE
C OMP ANIE S IN
THE
5G
C OMPETITION
L yu
J inghua
(Carnegie
E ndo wmen t
f or
In terna tional
Peace )
5.
WILL
5G
PUSH
INTERNET
V O TING?
S amuele
Dominioni
(ISPI)
6.
IT A L Y ,
NA TIONAL
SE CURITY
AND
5G
S tef ano
Mele
(Carnelu t ti)
T
5G
in
a
C ont es t ed
Domain
F abio
R ugge
MAECI,
ISPI
F abio
R ugge
is
Head
o f
ISPI" s
Cen tre
on
C yber securit y, in
partner ship
with
Leonar do.
He
is
a
dipl oma t
curren tl y w orking
as
Head
o f
the
Office
in
charge
f or
NA T O
and Securit y
and
P olitic o-Military I ssues,
D irect or a te
Gener al
f or P olitical
Affair s
and
Securit y,
Minis try
o f
F oreign
Affair s
and
he
in terna tional
deba te
regar ding
the acquisition o f
Chinese
5G
technol ogy appear s
s ymbolic
o f
the re-emerging
Grea t
P o wer
C ompe tition,
and
s tark
pr oo f o f
the ongoing
dec oupling
o f
the gl obal
IC T
supply
chain.
W ashingt on
has
been
pressing its
allies f or
more
than a
year
no t
t o
adopt Chinese
5G
technol ogy
and
threa tened
dr as tic cu ts
in
in telligence
inf orma tion- sharing
with tho se
pr ocuring
it.
We
canno t
ascribe
these de vel opmen ts
t o
W ashingt on ’ s
hidden
marke t - share
c onsider a tions,
as
the US
marke t
does no t
ye t
offer
a
c ompe ting technology,
nor
can we
c onsider
them
ye t
ano ther
e x ample
o f Presiden t
Trump’ s
t ough
po sitions on
tr ade nego tia tions,
especiall y
with
China,
because
it
is since
2012 tha t
the US
A dminis tr a tion
has pr ohibited se ver al
go vernmen t
agencies,
on the gr ounds
o f
“na tional
securit y
risk”,
fr om acquiring
pr oducts
fr om
Hua wei
and
ZTE, t w o o f
China ’ s
mo s t
success ful
high- tech
e xporter s. I s
Chinese
5G
technol ogy
so
danger ous, and
if so,
wh y
is the ban
on
Chinese
5G
technol ogy
so c on ten tious?
September
2020
IT ALIAN
INSTITUTE F OR
INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES
5G
ne t w ork s
will
enable
the Interne t
o f Things
re v olu tion,
which,
t oge ther
with the e xponen tial
pr ogresses
in
c ompu ting po wer
and
adv ances
in
AI,
will
tr ans f orm
our e very da y
life
in
w a y s
we
can
barel y
imagine. 5G
ne t w ork s
will
represen t
the nerv ous
s y s tem c onnecting
the political,
s tr a tegic,
military, inf orma tive,
ec onomic, financial,
indus trial
and
infr as tructural
dimensions
a t
a
per sonal, l ocal,
na tional,
in terna tional
and
tr ansna tional le vel.
In this
scenario, there are a t
leas t
three ca tegories
o f
risk s
tha t
migh t
arise fr om
rel ying upon
un trus ted
5G
ne t w ork s.
The
fir s t
is the “classic”
risk
o f
espionage
b y
f oreign
en tities
(be the y
go vernmen tal
or
priv a te
c ompanies subject
t o
a
s tr ong
go vernmen t ’ s
direction), targe ting go vernmen ts ’
c onfiden tial
inf orma tion, c ommercial
or
indus trial
secre ts,
our
per sonal lives.
This
w oul d
certainl y
po se
a
direct
threa t
t o
our
freedom, t o
our
independence
and
t o
our wel f are.
A
5G
c on tr olled
more
or
less
directl y b y
f oreign
en tities
w oul d
also
give
them
the po wer
t o
pr ofile
user s,
t o
manipula te
da ta
and divert
da ta
flo w,
and
even tuall y
t o
influence
our individual perceptions
and
our
public
opinions. C yber -enabled
inf orma tion
w arf are alread y appear s
t o
be
one
o f
the instrumen ts
o f
choice in
the ongoing
in terna tional
c onfr on ta tion,
and
it has
pr o ven
its
des tabilizing
po ten tial
in
se ver al in terna tional
crises.
De vel opmen ts
in
deep- f ake technol ogy
and
in
“au t oma ted
pr opaganda”
will certainl y
ele v a te
the threa t
even
further .
Finall y, in
time
o f
crisis,
an
un trus ted
pr o vider migh t
use
the ne t w ork
t o
e xert
political
and
ec onomic
pressure
and
t o
acquire
a
military
adv an tage, f or
instance
if
its
oper a t or s
denied
an
essen tial service
t o
a
critical
na tional
infr as tructure,
or
if
it
v olun taril y
pr o vided
f orged
da ta,
or
sabo taged essen tial
democr a tic
or
indus trial
pr ocesses,
or hampered
political
decision-making
on
issues
o f na tional
securit y
and
defence. Agains t
this
back dr op,
polic y -maker s
mus t decide
whe ther
t o
all o w
Chinese
off- the- shel f
pr o vider s
t o
pre v ail
or
if
it
is more appr opria te
t o
dela y
the fiel ding
o f
5G
in
or der f or
trus ted
vendor s
t o
be
able
t o
offer
a
sa fer and
more
secure
al terna tive.
I t
is indeed
an
unpreceden ted
dilemma
f or
our
polic y -maker s, accus t omed
t o
a
Wes tern
technol ogical superiorit y
tha t
is no w
increasingl y
challenged
in e very
domain, and
t o
free-marke t
dogmas
tha t manda ted
the gl obaliza tion
o f
supply
chains.
Responses
ha ve
so
f ar
been
diver se.
Some Wes tern
c oun tries
dela yed
the acquisition o f 5G
technol ogy
al t oge ther,
while some
o ther s tried
t o
dis tinguish
be t ween
“c ore”
and
“non- c ore”
parts
o f
the ne t w ork s,
assuming
it
will
be po ssible
t o
pr ocure
Chinese
5G
technol ogy f or
the la t ter .
Some
s ta tes,
also,
decided
t o impo se
specific securit y
s tandar ds
f or
IC T c omponen ts
f or
specific sect or s
o f
na tional securit y
importance. Man y
o ther s
ha ve
ye t
t o
sa y
the final
w or d,
and
ha ve
so
f ar
changed
their
po sition
a
fe w
times.
Na tional
securit y
c oncerns
normall y
pre v ail withou t
t oo
much
hassle
o ver
marke t
or ec onomic
de vel opmen t
c onsider a tions, especiall y
where
there is so
much
public a t ten tion.
The
issue
o f
Chinese
5G,
on
the o ther
hand,
seems
t o
be
o f
a
differen t
kind.
I s it
because
the Wes t
canno t
accept
delaying the digital
tr ans f orma tion
enabled
b y
5G,
no
ma t ter
what?
I s
it
because
o f
the very
significan t
in ves tmen ts
tha t
Chinese
pr o vider s
are willing t o
make
in
Wes tern
infr as tructure ?
Or
is it because,
a fter
S no w den ’ s
re vela tions,
the public opinions
o f
E ur ope
belie ve
tha t,
since
e very one hack s,
it
does
no t
reall y
make
a
difference who t o
trus t,
especiall y
in
the ab sence
o f
c oncre te pr oo fs
tha t
the Chinese
go vernmen t
used
its ascendanc y
o ver
Hua wei
and
ZTE
t o
hack
da ta ? Ma ybe
the ans wer
is a
c ombina tion
o f
bo th these
reasons,
or
ma ybe
the f act is tha t
there is simpl y
a
gener al
lack
o f
a w areness
abou t the threa ts
s temming
fr om
c yber space,
and po ssibl y
also
abou t
the reasons,
the bearings and
the pr actical
implications o f
the ongoing ne w
Grea t
P o wer
C ompe tition.
This
lack
o f
a w areness
is under s tandable: c yber space
is the domain
o f
ambiguit y,
where it
is impossible
t o
under s tand
and
an ticipate
the mo tiv a tion
and
the sc ope
o f
a
c yber
campaign withou t
c onsidering
the s tr a tegic,
political
and oper a tional
c on te xt
in
which
it
occur s.
The
difficul t y
in
a t tribu ting the c yber a t tack s,
t oge ther
with
the widespread
recour se
in
c yber space t o
f alsel y
flag
c ompu ter
ne t w ork
oper a tions, make
it
difficul t
t o
kno w
“wha t
is reall y
going
on”
in
the c yber
domain, and
t o
make
sense
ou t o f
it.
C ybercrime, hacktivism,
in telligence
and military
c ompu ter
ne t w ork
oper a tions,
all
share the same
domain
and
the y
all
use
the same tactic s,
techniques
and
pr ocedures,
and
the y all
e xpl oit
the same
vulner abilities.
C yber space has
theref ore
become
the domain
o f
choice
f or
des tabilising campaigns
and
engaging
in
ho s tile activities
tha t
w oul d
be
simpl y
unsus tainable in
the c on ven tional
realm.
Na tional
in telligence c ommunities
usuall y
are be t ter
placed
and equipped
t o
handle
sensible
inf orma tion
and
gr asp
the c omple xit y
“behind
the curtains”
o f the ongoing
c onfr on ta tion
in
the c yber
domain
– bu t
this
is also
ano ther
reason
wh y
an
in-depth under s tanding
o f
c yber
affair s
is no t
easil y accessible
t o
the gener al
public,
or
even
a t
the ins titu tional
le vel.
I f
wha t
happens
“in
and
ar ound” c yber space
is alread ...
