下面是小编为大家整理的非洲“青年就业”危,机实际上是“失去职位”危,机（完整文档）,供大家参考。
Contents
1
Intr oduction
3
The
dominant
narr ativ e
and
curr ent
e vidence
11
A
“ missing
jobs”
crisis
15
P olicy
conclusions
18
Ref er ences
Intr oduction
Oppor tunities
for
emplo yment,
or
the
lack of
them,
ha ve
long
been
a
centr al
inter est
of
African
go v ernments,
y oung
people,
and their
families.
Y outh
employment 1
is
also curr ently
the
subject
of
consider able
policy , r esear ch,
and
pr actitioner
inter est
(e.g.,
C T A
et
al.,
2014;
Filmer
and
F o x,
2014;
IDRC,
2015;
Losch,
2016;
The
W orld Bank,
2009,
2018; Y eboah,
2018).
The
“y outh
emplo yment” crisis
now
f eatur es
centr ally
in
most discussions
about
labor
mark ets
and
public policy
in
sub-Sahar an
Africa. 2
The
growing momentum
behind
the
idea
of
“inv esting
in
youth ”
has
led
t o
a
pr olif er ation
of
y outh- specific
and
y outh-tar geted
inter v entions.
Howe v er ,
the
fr aming
of
the
pr oblem as
a
“y outh
emplo yment”
crisis
means many
inter ventions
ar e
r elativ ely
small and
narrowly
tar geted,
especially
when international
development
par tners
ar e
inv olv ed.
Many
ha ve
limited
r esults
and
fail
t o addr ess
the
structur al
issues
that
inhibit
the cr eation
of
quality
jobs.
The
“it’ s
all
about
the youth ”
fr aming
ignor es
the
fact
that
y oung people
ar e
in
fact
caught
up
in
a
br oader African
“ missing
jobs”
crisis
that
r eflects fundamental
structur al
constr aints
within African
economies.
W e
ar e
not
the
first
t o
r aise
these
concerns and
call
for
structur al
change
t o
bolster the
demand
side
of
the
labor
mark et (Betcherman
and
Khan,
2018;
Filmer
and F o x,
2014;
Flynn
et
al.,
2017).
It is
also
the case
that,
outside
the
youth
employment
discussion,
much
has
been
written about
the need
t o
incr ease
employment
oppor tunities for
all
Africans
(Monga
et
al.,
2019).
The
contribution
of
this
paper
is
t o
bring t ogether
e vidence
fr om
a
wide
r ange
of sour ces;
indicate
wher e
the
e vidence suppor ts
the
curr ent
policy
or thodoxy
and wher e
it
does
not; and
map
out
an
alternative policy
narr ativ e
and
policy
landscape.
Ther e is
no
doubt
that
t oo
many
y oung
people
ha ve
difficulty
finding
work that
pr o vides
a satisfact or y
liv elihood.
Howe v er ,
we
ar gue that
this
is
only
one
aspect
of
the
br oader employment
crisis.
In
other wor ds,
the pr oblem
is
with
the
economy
and
“ missing jobs”
for
ev er y one—not
just
for
y oung
people.
Below ,
we
critically
interr ogate
the
dominant narr ativ e
about
youth
employment
in
sub-Sahar an
Africa,
looking
acr oss
fiv e dimensions:
demogr aphy ,
violence
and
civil unr est,
tr aining
and
skills,
entr epr eneurship in
the
urban
ser vice
economy ,
and
the
rur al economy .
This
dominant
narr ativ e
ma y
be
summed
up
as
something
lik e:
ther e
ar e
(t oo)
1
In
this
paper ,
y outh
is
defined
as
people
between
the
ages of
15-24.
Recognizing
that
y outh
is
a
social construct,
and
not
all
y outh
tr ansition
int o adulthood
at
the
same
time
or
in
the
same
way ,
we
nonetheless
find
that
the
U.N. ’ s
demogr aphic
designation
of
y outh
as
within
the
age
r ange
of 15-24
pr o vides
enough
homogeneity
with
r espect
t o
challenges
and
oppor tunities
in
the
labor
mark et,
as
well
as
public
policy
and
pr ogr ammatic initiativ es,
t o
be
useful
for
this
paper.
2
In
this
paper ,
the
term
“ Africa ”
r ef ers
t o
sub-Sahar an
Africa
only.
many
y oung
people
in
sub-Sahar an
Africa; when
“idle, ”
they
ar e
easily
dr awn
int o
crime and
violence;
they
can ’t
get
the
jobs
that ar e
a v ailable
because
they
lack
technical and
soft
skills
and
ther efor e
need
tr aining; they
ar e
innately
inno v ativ e,
and
ther efor e their
entr epr eneurial
potential
needs
t o
be
awak ened;
and
they
ar e
a verse
t o
agricultur e. This
narr ativ e
suggests
that
the
crisis
is
v er y much
“y outh-specific ”
(Ir win
et
al.,
2018): Y oung
people
ar e
both
the
pr oblem
and
the solution,
and
thus
y outh-specific
or
y outh- tar geted
inter ventions
must
be
prioritiz ed.
W e
pr opose
a
counternarr ativ e
that
locates the
fundamental
pr oblem
not
with
y oung Africans,
but
with
the
structur e
of
African economies,
which
pr o vide
far
t oo
f ew oppor tunities
for
decent
work for
people
of
all
ages.
Thus,
the
so-called
youth employment
pr oblem
cannot
be
solv ed in
isolation
fr om
the
major
economic
challenges
that
countries
face
t oda y .
Indeed, a
focus
on
y outh-tar geted
inter ventions actually
distr acts
policymak ers
and stak eholders
fr om
dev eloping
the
policy agenda
for
structur al
change.
Only
a
wider set
of
policy
options
that
giv e
priority t o tackling
br oader
structur al
issues
has
the potential
t o
deliv er
much
bigger
r esults,
for people
of
all
ages.
The
dominant
narr ativ e
and curr ent
e vidence
Demogr aphics as
thr eat
and oppor tunity
The
demogr aphic
“fact”
at
the
hear t
of contemporary
inter est
in
youth
employment in
sub-Sahar an
Africa
is
Africa ’ s
r elativ e y outhfulness—interpr eted
variously
as
an oppor tunity ,
a
thr eat,
or
both—due t o
a
slow and
late
demogr aphic
tr ansition
(see
Figur e 1).
The
oft-r epeated
claim
that
“ Africa
is
the
y oungest
continent”
and
the
image
of
a “y outh
bulge ”
ar e
foundational
t o
the
crisis narr ativ e
around
youth
employment
(e.g., Gates
and
Gates,
2019;
Gyimah-Br empong and
Kimenyi,
2013;
NEP AD ,
2016),
even though
the
fact
of
lar ge
shar es
of
y oung people
entering
the
labor
mark et
is
neither new
nor specific
t o
sub-Sahar an
Africa.
The
element
of
thr eat
and
crisis
is
commonly offset
in
policy
discussions
b y
hopes
for
a
“ demogr aphic
dividend”:
a
one-off economic
windfall
associated
with
the “bulge ”
generation
successfully
entering
the labor
mark et, earning
a
good
income,
and sa ving
and
inv esting
that
income
in
the
next gener ation,
which
is
smaller ,
owing
t o
lower f er tility
(see
Drummond
et
al.,
2014).
T o gain
this
dividend—which
ma y ,
accor ding
t o one
estimate
(UNFP A,
2014),
be
wor th
up
t o
$500
billion
per
year
in
sub-Sahar an
Africa, or
about
one-thir d
of
the
r egion ’ s
GD P ,
for
30 y ears—would
r equir e
the
“right” inv estments, typically
in
education
and
tr aining.
Y oung
people ’ s
pr oductivity ,
it
is
often
ar gued,
would be
accelerated
b y
their
gr eater
capacity ,
as “ digital
nativ es”
t o
engage
with
information and
communication
technologies
(ICT s) (A GRA,
2015).
Y et
a
mor e
nuanced
interpr etation
of demogr aphic
tr ends
shows
that
both
the
siz e of
the
“bulge ”
and
the
attendant
demogr aphic dividend,
ma y
be
o v er estimated.
The
youth
shar e
of
both
the
whole
population and
the
working-age
population
in
Africa was
indeed
lar ge
at
its
peak
but
has
been declining
for
some
time
(see
Figur e
1),
albeit at
diff er ent
r ates
in
diff er ent
countries. 3 Owing
t o
lower labor
for ce
participation
of
school-aged
y outh,
the
youth
shar e
of the
emplo y ed
population
is
24
per cent t oda y
(IL OST A T).
The
likelihood
of
r ealizing a
lar ge
demogr aphic
dividend
is
also debatable,
as
it
would
r equir e
a
far
mor e r apid
decline
in
f er tility
and
an
associated lar ger
rise
in
sa vings
than
is
curr ently pr ojected
for
sub-Sahar an
Africa
(Lee
and Mason,
2011;
Y azbeck
et
al.,
2015).
This
is because
the
labor
for ce
needs
t o
be
able
3
A
version
of
Figur e
1
with
country
disaggr egation
would
show
substantial
r egional
variation
acr oss
sub-Sahar an
Africa,
owing
t o
variation
in
the speed
of
f ertility
decline.
Howev er ,
only
the
Republic
of
South
Africa
is
well
below
the
sub-Sahar an
African
line,
following
closely
the
path
of
South Asia.
Ghana
is
slightly
below
the
r egional
a v er age
t oday ,
and
Ethiopia
and
K eny a
ar e
pr ojected
t o
fall
below
the
pr ojected
r egional
a v er age
by
2025, while
Niger
and
the
Democr atic
Republic
of
the
Congo
ar e
pr ojected
t o
r emain
well
abov e
it
thr ough
2050.
Figur e
1:
Y outh
(ages
15-24)
shar e
of
working-age
population,
actual
and
projected
b y
r egion
P eaks
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Note:
U.N.
projections after 2019.
Sour ce:
United
Nations W orld P opulation prospects 2019
(Medium V ariant).
t o
earn
incr easingly
mor e
income
r elativ e t o
household
consumption
t o
suppor t
the inv estments
needed
for
the
dividend,
but
a
r apidly
growing
labor
for ce
depr esses
wages and
priv ate
sa vings.
As
a
r esult,
slowly declining
dependency
r atios
and
a
high degree
of
informality—wher e
earnings
rise slowly
and
skills
do
not
earn
as
high
a
r eturn as
in
formal
emplo yment—limit, if
not
er ase, the
potential
African
dividend.
Inv estments in
tr aining
will
not
change
this
pattern;
only br oad-based
economic
development
t o cr eate
mor e
demand
for
labor
in
the
formal sect or ,
combined
with
slower
gr owth
of
the
labor
for ce
will
change
the
pattern,
a
t opic
we will
r eturn
t o
below .
Unemplo yment
leads t o
violence and
unr est
Another r eason
policymak ers
ha ve
focused attention
on
Africa ’ s
youth
is
a
pr esumed
link
between
the
lack
of
employment oppor tunities
for
y oung
people
on
the
one hand,
and
political
violence,
...
