下面是小编为大家整理的阿拉伯联合酋长国打击洗钱和资助恐怖主义措施,供大家参考。
1
Table
of
Contents
Executive Summary
3 Key
Findings
3
Risks
and
General
Situation
6
Overall
Level
of
Compliance
and
Effectiveness
6
Priority
Actions
13
Effectiveness
&
Technical
Compliance
Ratings
16
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT
17 Preface
17
CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT
19 ML/TF
Risks
and
Scoping
of
Higher
Risk
Issues
20
Materiality
23
Structural
Elements
23
Background
and
Other
Contextual
Factors
23
CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO- ORDINATION
35 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
35
Immediate
Outcome
1
(Risk,
Policy
and
Coordination)
37
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES
47 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
47
Immediate
Outcome
6
(Financial
Intelligence
ML/TF)
52
Immediate
Outcome
7
(ML
investigation
and
prosecution)
66
Immediate
Outcome
8
(Confiscation)
77
CHAPTER 4. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION
85 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
85
Immediate
Outcome
9
(TF
investigation
and
prosecution)
89
Immediate
Outcome
10
(TF
preventive
measures
and
financial
sanctions)
104
Immediate
Outcome
11
(PF
financial
sanctions)
115
CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
119 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
119
Immediate
Outcome
4
(Preventive
Measures)
120
CHAPTER 6. SUPERVISION
131 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
131
Immediate
Outcome
3
(Supervision)
133
CHAPTER 7. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
169 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
169
Immediate
Outcome
5
(Legal
Persons
and
Arrangements)
171
2 CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
181 Key
Findings
and
Recommended
Actions
181
Immediate
Outcome
2
(International
Cooperation)
183
TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX
199 Recommendation
1
–
Assessing
risks
and
applying
a
risk-based
approach
199
Recommendation
2
-
National
Cooperation
and
Coordination
202
Recommendation
3
-
Money
laundering
offence
204
Recommendation
4
-
Confiscation
and
provisional
measures
205
Recommendation
5
-
Terrorist
financing
offence
206
Recommendation
6
-
Targeted
financial
sanctions
related
to
terrorism
and
terrorist
financing
209
Recommendation
7
–
Targeted
financial
sanctions
related
to
proliferation
215
Recommendation
8
–
Non-profit
organisations
220
Recommendation
9
–
Financial
institution
secrecy
laws
228
Recommendation
10
–
Customer
due
diligence
228
Recommendation
11
–
Record-keeping
232
Recommendation
12
–
Politically
exposed
persons
233
Recommendation
13
–
Correspondent
banking
234
Recommendation
14
–
Money
or
value
transfer
services
234
Recommendation
15
–
New
technologies
236
Recommendation
16
–
Wire
transfers
237
Recommendation
17
–
Reliance
on
third
parties
239
Recommendation
18
–
Internal
controls
and
foreign
branches
and
subsidiaries
240
Recommendation
19
–
Higher-risk
countries
241
Recommendation
20
–
Reporting
of
suspicious
transaction
242
Recommendation
21
–
Tipping-off
and
confidentiality
243
Recommendation
22
–
DNFBPs:
Customer
due
diligence
243
Recommendation
23
–
DNFBPs:
Other
measures
245
Recommendation
24
–
Transparency
and
beneficial
ownership
of
legal
persons
246
Recommendation
25
–
Transparency
and
beneficial
ownership
of
legal
arrangements
250
Recommendation
26
–
Regulation
and
supervision
of
financial
institutions
253
Recommendation
27
–
Powers
of
supervisors
256
Recommendation
28
–
Regulation
and
supervision
of
DNFBPs
257
Recommendation
29
-
Financial
intelligence
units
259
Recommendation
30
–
Responsibilities
of
law
enforcement
and
investigative
authorities
263
Recommendation
31
-
Powers
of
law
enforcement
and
investigative
authorities
265
Recommendation
32
–
Cash
Couriers
266
Recommendation
33
–
Statistics
268
Recommendation
34
–
Guidance
and
feedback
268
Recommendation
35
–
Sanctions
269
Recommendation
36
–
International
instruments
272
Recommendation
37
-
Mutual
legal
assistance
272
Recommendation
38
–
Mutual
legal
assistance:
freezing
and
confiscation
274
Recommendation
39
–
Extradition
275
Recommendation
40
–
Other
forms
of
international
co-operation
275
Summary of Technical Compliance – Key Deficiencies
280 Glossary of Acronyms
283
Executive
Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This
report
summarises
the
anti-money
laundering
and
counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures in place in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as at the date of the on-site visit from 1 – 18 July 2019. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of the UAE’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened.
Key Findings
AML/CFT
system
including
developing
the
National
Risk
Assessmt
(NRA), addressing
technical
deficiencies
in
legislation
and
regulation,
strengthening co-ordination
mechanisms
across
the
Emirates,
strengthening
the
Financial Intelligence
Unit
(FIU)
and
assigning
supervisors
for
previously
non-covered sectors. Many of these enhancements to the system are recent, and while they hav a
positive
impact
on
the
UAE’s
technical
compliance,
their
impact
on
the effectiveness of the system was not fully evident at the time of the on-site visit. b)
The UAE has demonstrated a high-level commitment to better understand and
mitigate
its
money
laundering/terrorist
financing
(ML/TF)
risk
in
a coordinated way and has an emerging understanding of its ML/TF risks. The NRA is
a
good
starting
point
for
expressing
ML/TF
threats
and
vulnerabilities
at
a national
level.
However,
the
NRA
and
other
assessments
provide
only
a
basic description of the complex ML issues facing the jurisdiction. Issues identified with the
methodology
bring
into
question
some
conclusions
authoritie have
mad about TF risk. Authorities’ ability to articulate relevant ML/TF risks beyond the NRA
is
varied.
The
National
AML/CFT
Committee
has
begun
implementing
an ambitious
National
AML
Strategy
to
strengthen
the
UAE’s
overall
AML/CFT framework.
These
are
important
steps
in
improving
overall
effectiveness, however,
it
is
too
early
to
assess
their
impact
in
mitigating
sophisticated
risks posed by, for example, professional ML networks or trade-based ML. In the past few years, the UAE has made significant improvements to its a)
4
4
4 c) A
strong
feature
of
the
UAE’s
financial
intelligence
framework
is
that authorities have access
to a broad range of financial information sources
to aid
investigations.
However,
apart
from
in
TF
and
fraud
investigation financial intelligence is not fully exploited in response to other significant risks, including ML, or in relation to the recovery of the proceeds
of crime. Particular issues are the underutilisation of customs data and international cooperation and the absence of STR reporting by DNFPBs (real estate and DPMS) which limits t financial
intelligence
available
in
relation
to
high-risk
sectors
in
the
UAE.
The limited
role
and
capacity
of
the
FIU
has
impacted
the
quality
of
financial intelligence
available
to
investigators.
The
FIU
has
taken
steps
to
address
its resource needs and analytical capability, but the results of these measures are at early stages. d) Following recent changes, the UAE has a sound statutory ML offence and a policy
shift
in
2018
seeks
to
prioritise
ML.
Although
there
are
various opportunities
to
detect
ML,
LEAs
are
not
routinely
identifying
and
targeting significant
ML
cases
in
line
with
the
UAE’s
risk
profile.
Across
the
Emirates, between
2013
and
2018,
there
were
282
ML
cases
identified
by
police
prosecutors of which 224 were further investigated by PPs, 50 prosecutions and 33 convictions for ML. The low number of ML prosecutions in Dubai is particularly concerning
considering
its
recognised
risk
profile.
A
number
of
recent investigations,
supported
by
increased
coordination,
training,
awareness
and resources,
suggest
that
authorities
are
placing
a
stronger
emphasis
on sophisticated ML risks. However, many of these activities are at early stages and it has not been demonstrated that the component parts of the system (investigation, prosecution, conviction and sanctions) are functioning coherently to mitigate ML risks. e) In line with the overarching policy shift in 2018, the National Committee and
the
newly
formed
ML
Investigations
Sub-Committee
have
identified as a key policy objective and overall the UAE’s figures for domestic and fines, repatriation, sharing and restitution are large due to broad confiscation powers. While the UAE routinely removes instrumentalities crime it was not demonstrated this occurs for the proceeds of foreign predicate offences, which iacknowledged as a key crime risk. In relation to cross-border cash and precious metals movements, while penalties have been applied for false or lacking declarations, there is an absence of absence of formal case adoption by the Police or State Security. Work is underway to improve the collection of statistics. f) The UAE identifies and investigates TF activities to a large extent, and the role of the terrorist financier is
generally identified. State Security has
a robust array of tools, data ss and capabilities it can employ to investigate and analyse -related activity. Between 2013 and 2019, 92 persons have been prosecuted for TF and 75 have been convicted, yielding a conviction rate of 82%. g) The UAE is implementing TF-related targeted financial sanctions (TFS) to some extent and PF-related TFS to a limited extent, and in both cases not without delay. The relatively new UNSCR De...
